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Abstract 
Evidence has been mounting that the interest-based debt financing regime is under 
increasing distress. Evidence also suggests that the financial crises, whatever title they 
carried - exchange rate crisis or banking crisis – have been debt crises in essence. At present, 
data suggest that the debt-to-GDP ratio of the richest members of the G-20 is expected to 
reach 120% mark by 2014. There is also evidence that out of securities worth US$ 200 
trillion in the global economy, no less than three-fourth represents interest-based debt. It is 
difficult to see how this massive debt volume can be validated by the underlying productive 
capacity of the global economy. This picture becomes more alarming considering the anemic 
state of global economic growth. There is great uncertainty with regard to interest rates. 
Although policy-driven interest rates are near-zero level, there is no assurance that they will 
not rise as the risk and inflation premia become significant. Hence, a more serious financial 
crisis may be in the offing and a general collapse of asset prices may occur. This paper 
argues that the survival of the interest-based debt regime is becoming less tenable, as is the 
process of financialization that has accompanied the growth of global finance over the last 
four decades. It further argues that Islamic finance, with its core characteristic of risk 
sharing, may well be a viable alternative to the present interest-based debt financing regime. 
Keywords: Regime Uncertainty, Ambiguity, Complexity, Black Swans, Debt Stress, Islamic 
finance, Risk-Sharing. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At a time when the global economy is suffering from a crisis of confidence, structural 
imbalances, large fiscal deficits, too easy money policies, high inflation and unemployment, 
and subdued growth prospects, a growing sense of uncertainty prevailing world over is 
palpable. Evidence has been mounting that the interest based debt financing regime is under 
ever increasing distress. It has been shown that crises whatever label they carried− exchange 
rate crisis or banking crisis – have been debt crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).  Empirical 
research suggests that debt-to-GDP ratio of the richest members of the G-20 will reach 120% 
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mark by 2014 while by 2020 the U.S. and other major European centers would amass a ratio 
of at least 150%, with Japan and U.K. going to 300% and 200% respectively. Even more 
disconcerting is the projected interest rate paths on their debts which would increase from 5% 
to 10% in all cases, and as high as 27% in U.K (BIS, 2010). Moreover, there is also evidence 
that out of securities worth $200 trillion in the global economy, no less than three-fourth 
represent interest based debt (Rogoff, 2011). This picture becomes more alarming when it is 
realized that the growth of the global economy is anemic at best while the interest rate on 
debt is sure to exceed the rate of growth of global GDP for the foreseeable future. According 
to the World Bank, global GDP is projected to increase 2.5% in 2012, with growth 
accelerating to 3% and 3.3% in 2013 and 2014 (World Bank, 2012). 
Fiscal austerity measures taken as remedial response are further weakening growth and 
employment prospects, making fiscal adjustment and the repair of financial sector balance 
sheets all the more challenging. With still rapidly building debt, excessive fiscal deficits, 
massive unemployment, and falling real-incomes uncertainty has increased regarding how 
economies, capital markets, and international trade and finance will evolve. Likely scenarios 
of hyperinflation or prolonged stagflation cannot be discarded easily. Policies appear to be 
locked into the same regimes of near-zero interest rates, negative real interest rates, and 
rapidly rising public and private debt that led to the economic and financial collapse earlier. 
Stock markets and housing markets are going through renewed bubbles fuelled only by credit 
multiplication and near zero interest rates.1 Exchange rates are highly unpredictable. In 
Europe, concerns and uncertainty about the institutional integrity of the eurozone – key to the 
architecture of modern Europe – continue to mount.  
The World Bank in its latest report on Global Economic Prospects, 2012 suggests that 
Banking-sector deleveraging is cutting into growth and developing country capital flows, 
faced with rising funding costs, increased counter-party risk assessments, deteriorating bank-
asset-quality, and growing concerns over the adequacy of capitalization.  Even if the threat of 
a full-blown crisis is somehow averted, elevated fiscal deficits and debts and the very loose 
monetary policies being pursued in the high-income world, proposes that for the next several 
years the external environment for both developed and developing economies is likely to 
remain characterized by volatile capital flows and unsettled business sentiment. As a result, it 
is becoming harder to gauge the impact of the constant surge in financial market turmoil on 
the real sector of the economy, but it is almost certain to be negative. How negative is 
extremely uncertain. This uncertainty extends to the stability and sustainability of  the 
international economic and financial system. 
These developments and the fragility of the global financial setup signal the presence and 
growing sense of a “regime uncertainty”; uncertainty regarding the benefits and costs as well 
as the sustainability of the regime of interest rate based debt finance Robert Higgs (1997) 
argued that the depth of uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding the policy regime and its 
                                                            
1 The U.S. Federal Reserve has been implementing most unorthodox money policy in the U.S. history of money 
printing and credit creation at near-zero interest rate under the so-called quantitative easing programs.  
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economic and financial consequences is the essence of ‘regime uncertainty’; a phenomenon 
that aggravated the ‘Great Depression’ (Higgs, 1997). Moreover, the continuing adverse 
economic and social consequences, as well as the failure of significant policy actions to elicit 
the desired response, provide evidence that the global financial system displays the 
characteristics of a ‘complex system’. The financial sector is now being increasingly thought 
of as a system governed by feedback processes or knock-on effects (Johnson, 2007). It means 
that the system is influenced by past events, nullifying any ‘random walk’ phenomenon 
(Mandelbrot and Hudson, 2004 and Peters, 1996). The system corresponds to ‘critical state’ 
phenomena in which the long-range dependence between the elements can affect massive 
systemic changes due to small changes in certain parameter; another important feature that 
assures the complexity of the system (Bookstaber, 2011). The U.S. subprime crisis can be 
clearly referred to as one of those small marginal changes that have affected the dynamics of 
the whole system. Given the events in countries such as Greece subsequent to the 2007/2008 
US crisis, it appears that the global financial system is at a point where a sovereign default by 
one country can prove chaotic to global economy. According to Mauldin and Tepper (2011) 
 
“When things are unstable, it isn’t the last grain of sand that causes the pile to 
collapse or the slight breeze that causes the ruler on your finger tip to fall. 
Those are proximate causes. They are the closet reasons at hand for the 
collapse. The real reason though, is the remote cause, the farthest reason. The 
farthest reason is the underlying instability of the system itself”. 
 
United Nations system, in various publications such as the World Economic Situation and 
Prospects and the Trade and Development Report, has suggested that the complexities and 
the vast interconnectedness of excessive risk-taking in financial markets with the problem of 
the global imbalances, volatile commodity prices, pervasive economic uncertainty and 
declining trends in productive investment have made economic crisis systemic and 
synchronized worldwide; hinting that the crisis is fast turning into a humanitarian disaster if 
necessary measure are not taken to address the systemic flaws in the international financial 
architecture. 
 
Hence, there is increasing uncertainty regarding the stability and sustainability of the interest 
rate based debt financing regime; exacerbating the perception that the present financing 
system is unable to mitigate effectively the risks to the global economy. The search is on for a 
paradigm shift towards a less volatile and more resilient system2. The purpose of this study is 
to suggest that Islamic finance provides such an alternative to the present crises-ridden 
conventional finance, in form of a financial system that is based on “Risk Sharing”. Quran 
and Sunna strictly forbid interest (Riba) contracts and any form of riba. Moreover, Allah 
                                                            
2For further evidence on the ongoing search for a more stable economic alternative, see Richard Heinberg, 
Transition Networks, The Centre for the Advancement of a Steady State Economy, Positive Money, 
Breakthrough Capitalism, and the New Economics Foundation, among many other international organizations, 
all exploring ways to create more understanding and strategies for necessary and urgent change. 
4 
 
discourages hoarding; hence, investment and risk-taking are fully permissible. Many writers 
during the 19th and 20th centuries have strongly advocated a risk-sharing system very much 
reminiscent of Islamic finance (Holt Carrol, 1848, Amasa Walker, 1873, The Chicago Plan 
1933, Murray Rothbard, Maurice Allais, etc.) 
Since it is the contention of this paper that Islamic finance is all about risk sharing, it 
proceeds to discuss briefly the notions of risk, uncertainty and ambiguity in Section II. It then 
elaborates on the present debt overhang that has created debilitating fears of contagion and 
recurrence of another full-fledged global crisis. These fears are exacerbated by the 
complexity of conventional finance. Section III discusses the concept of complexity and the 
need for a shift towards a different financing regime. Explanation of the notion of ‘regime 
uncertainty’ comprises the content of Section IV. Section V contains a discussion of the 
inherent instability of the interest-based credit system. The Islamic approach to money and 
finance is discussed in Section VI. Sections VII and VIII of the paper argue that the new 
regime will need to be based on the idea of risk sharing – the essence of Islamic finance. The 
discussion of risk sharing focuses on how such a system can create stability and resilience in 
the individual economies as well as in the global financial system and thus reduce the 
frequency and severity of crises that have plagued the global economy. Based on the risk 
sharing principle, Section IX thus argues that innovative approaches are required to promote 
Islamic capital markets. Finally, Section X concludes the discussion.  
II. RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND AMBIGUITY 
Decisions are made, at times, based on available probability distribution of expected events. 
This is decision making under risk. Unlike risk however, uncertainty describes a situation 
where a known probability distribution is not available but it is still possible to make 
decisions with some subjective estimates of probability of outcomes of actions or decisions. 
In the 1960s this view was modified to cover circumstances under which human cognitive 
ability and information availability are so constrained that even subjective assessment of 
outcomes was not possible (Ellsberg, 1961). Ambiguity arises under circumstances where the 
intensity of ‘ignorance’ can create paralysis in decision making (for detail discussions see 
Erbas and Mirakhor, 2007 and 2010).  
Much uncertainty has prevailed in capital markets in the recent decade creating an 
environment less conducive to long-term investment in the real sector and more attractive to 
financial speculation. This uncertainty has been caused by distortive and destabilizing 
policies of the major reserve currencies. Because of their dominance in international trade 
and finance, these policies have adversely affected other economies. Uncertainty 
characterizes stock prices, housing and bond prices, commodity prices, interest and exchange 
rates. Although uncertainty existed in the past, it has become too excessive in recent times. 
To illustrate, US data provide an example of how policies have exacerbated uncertainty. 
Figures 1 to 4 exhibit movements in the S&P stock index over the period 1871-2012 and 
illustrate volatility associated with uncertainty. Table 1 below provides the percentage 
changes of the S&P Index over the same period.  
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Figures 1-4: Volatility of the S&P Stock Index 
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Figure 1: Nominal S&P 500 index, 1871-1921
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                              Figure 2. Nominal S&P 500 Index, 1921-1950
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  Figure 3. Nominal S&P 500 index, 1950-2000
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   Figure 4. Nominal S&P 500 Index, 2000-2012
 
Source: http://www.irrationalexuberance.com/index.htm and Yahoo finance 
 
                            Table 1: Percentage Changes of S&P 500 Index, 1871-2012 
 
Years 1871-1921 1921-1950 1950-2000 2000-2012 
Mean (in percent) 1.62 5.70 9.238 0.56 
Standard deviation 11.32 20.96 11.50 14.36 
Jarque-Bera 7.25 3566 98.2 113.47 
Probability value 0.027 0 0 0 
Memorandum items     
US real GDP growth 3.77 3.94 3.63 1.75 
Standard deviation  5.29 8.01 2.41 1.96 
Source: http://www.measuringworth.com/ 
 
The period 1871-1921, although characterized by few severe crises in 1873, 1895 and 1907, 
displayed a moderate rate of shares appreciation at 1.62%. Uncertainty measured by the 
standard deviation of the stock price changes at 11.32% was relatively high in relation to real 
gross domestic product (5.29%). The normality assumption for the percentage changes may 
be accepted with a probability value of 2.7%. It is noteworthy that during the sample period 
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1871-1921 stock booms were relatively short-lived; stock price crashes were also brief and 
represented corrections for over-valuation of shares. Crises were of short duration, followed 
by prompt and spontaneous recoveries. There was no systematic monetary policy designed to 
forcefully propel stock prices or re-inflate prices in general.  
The sample period 1921-1950 exhibited higher uncertainty measured at 20.96%. The rate of 
appreciation of stock prices was high at 5.7%. The sample period was characterized by one of 
the longest stock booms (1921-1929), sustained essentially by expansionary monetary policy 
of the Federal Reserve in the form of very low interest rates and considerable liquidity 
injection, and by a large amount of credit, called ‘call loans’ or ‘brokers’ loans, from 
domestic and foreign sources. The resulting high liquidity fueled significant speculation in 
real estate and share prices. Although, the stock boom became too speculative and clearly 
unsustainable, no policy maker dared to sound the alarm, “take away the punch bowl”, and 
spoil the party. The rate of annual appreciation of stock prices was 18.1% during 1921-1929. 
Since companies pay only dividends, the rate of appreciation is an excess return paid, not 
from the profits of the companies, but by players participating in the stock market, a zero-
sum game. For the boom to continue there should be buyers who are willing to transfer 
wealth to speculators indefinitely into the future. However, if more buyers realize that shares 
have become too overvalued, and the price-earnings ratio has become too high, the boom 
exhausts its momentum;3 the stock market was bound to crash in October 1929, and exhibited 
considerable volatility thereafter. 
The sample period 1950-2000 could easily be split into two sub-samples 1950-1987 and 
1987-2000 market by one-day crash of 20% in October 1987. The Fed (Federal Reserve 
System, the central bank of the United States) responded to the 1987 crash by an overly lax 
monetary policy designed to prop up share prices and extend the stock market boom. The 
policy of supporting stock prices became known as the Greenspan put. Stock prices 
appreciated at a very high rate of 9.3% per year during 1950-2000 (Mirakhor and Krichene, 
2009). Since companies pay only dividends, the excess returns on stocks over companies’ net 
profits were generated essentially through real transfers of wealth to the gainers from the 
stock price appreciation. As in the period 1921-1929, the stock boom was too prolonged for 
the same reason, namely the lax monetary policies that provided abundant liquidity to 
speculators, including the yen carry trade of the 1990s. The continuation of this policy regime 
became unsustainable and the crash ensued dramatically.  
The sample period 2000-2012 was characterized also by a lax monetary policy of the US 
Federal Reserve. This period witnessed the worst financial crisis (2007-2008) since the Great 
Depression and spread financial chaos to the rest of the global economy. Striving to revive 
the stock boom and prevent deflation of stock prices, interest rates were lowered to one 
                                                            
3  The degree of over-valuation is measured by the difference between the market price and the theoretical price 
of a share. The latter is equal to the expected dividends discounted by a normal rate of return. For instance, if 
a share is expected to pay a dividend of $4 per year and if the discount rate is 5%, then its theoretical price is a 
maximum of $4/0.05=$80. If it trades at $100, then it is overvalued by $20. Such a share is preferably to be 
avoided by long-term investors.  
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percent during 2002-2004 and massive liquidity was injected into the economy disrupting the 
housing market as well as the stocks, commodities and exchange markets. The result was an 
uncertain and distorted environment that rarely encourages long-term investment in the real 
economy. In spite of near-zero interest rates and massive liquidity injection, stock prices 
could not be propelled back to their peak.  
Uncertainty was not confined to the stock market alone; it also spread to commodities, bonds, 
and exchange markets. Commodity prices recorded two-digit inflation during the decade 
2002-2012. Food prices reached very high levels, causing food riots in some countries. 
Exacerbated by the wide spread use of commodity indices, crude oil prices rose from average 
of US$ 18/barrel in the 1990s to a record of US$ 147/barrel in 2008. Gold prices rose from 
US$ 250/ounce in the 1990s to a record of US$ 1860/ounce in 2011 (http://www.ft.com).  
Exchange rates also displayed large volatility with partner nations engaging in currency wars. 
Currency markets became more propitious to speculation and less favorable for long-term 
capital movements as foreign exchange risk becomes too high for stocks and bonds. 
Moreover, easy monetary policy forced interest rates to near-zero level in 2008 and 
afterwards. In view of the fiscal deficit that currently exceeds 10% of GDP and the high level 
of the US debt, the interest rates may be kept at near-zero level for a long time in the future as 
happened during 1930-1950 when the policymakers forced interest rates to very low levels 
thus creating a liquidity trap and discouraging long-term investment in the real sector of the 
economy. If interest rates rise, all asset prices crash, which will cause a capital loss to wealth 
holders. 
Besides the uncertainties regarding asset prices, there has been considerable uncertainty 
regarding consumer prices. Excessive fiscal deficits financed by monetization contribute 
significantly to increase consumer prices. There is also uncertainty regarding economic 
growth. In the 1930s, unlike the current periods, there was abundance of working capital in 
the form of large supplies of agricultural products and raw materials as demonstrated by 
significant fall in the prices of these products during 1929-1937, which, in turn, helped 
recovery. Combined with an energy policy that diverts food grains into fuel and severe 
drought conditions, speculation using instruments such as composite commodity indices have 
built significant upward pressure on food prices. The risk of emergence of food crises across 
the world and spread of famine and malnutrition cannot be dismissed. In the US alone 47 
million live on food stamps (http://www.usda.gov/). Food prices have doubled and tripled in 
the last six years and food price inflation has been on the rise. Crude oil production is limited 
to a maximum of 87 million barrels and could be a constraint on economic growth which will 
also be constrained by excessive fiscal deficits as these deficits contribute to reduced real 
saving necessary for investment in the real sector of the economy where real economic 
growth originates. 
It appears overall that uncertainty in the capital and commodities markets has strengthened in 
the past decades. The above data can be replicated in other industrial countries that have 
followed the same policy regime. Considering policy decisions made over time whose 
consequences are reflected in Table 1 and Figures 1-4 above, it appears that a concept 
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advanced by the system theorist Ilya Prigogine (1980, 1989 and 1997), namely the “point of 
bifurcation” has been operating to increase regime uncertainty. Chaos theory argues that a 
“complex system” approaching a bifurcation point becomes so sensitive that it can amplify 
small changes into large feedbacks. Decisions made at such points lead the system either 
toward greater chaos or toward higher order (Mirakhor and Hamid, 2009: 231; Prigogine, 
1980). From the historical records reported above, it appears that at every bifurcation point 
policy makers have made decisions that have rendered the system more unstable. 
III. COMPLEXITY OF INTEREST-BASED DEBT FINANCE 
The interest-based system was generally assumed superior to the interest free system on the 
criterion of efficiency and stability (Chapra, 2007). However, both the efficiency as well as 
the stability argument in favour of the conventional interest-based system of financial 
intermediation seems to have been substantially weakened by the crises it has experienced 
over the last few decades. According to one estimate, there have been more than 100 crises 
over the last four decades (Stiglitz, 2003, p. 54). The crises engulf even those countries that 
generally appear to follow sound fiscal and monetary policies. 
 
A number of economists have made an effort to determine the causes of the crises. Some 
consider financial liberalization to be the cause in an environment where financial systems of 
many countries are not sound as a result of improper regulation and supervision (Bisignano, 
1999; Glick, 1998). Others feel that the ultimate cause is the bursting of the speculative 
bubble in asset prices driven initially by the excesses of financial intermediaries (Krugman, 
1998). It has also been argued that the root cause of the crises was the maturity mismatch: 
short-term international liabilities were far greater than short-term assets (Chang and Velasco, 
1998; Radelet and Sachs, 1998). Even though all these factors had some role to play in the 
crises, no consensus seems to have developed so far in pinpointing the ultimate cause or the 
cause of all causes (Chapra, 2007, 2008).  
 
However, there is an alternative view which holds that instability and crises are inherent and 
unavoidable in financial capitalism, because the structure of firms and households is 
inherently fragile and the emergence and confluence of certain conditions convert fragility 
into instability and crises (see Mirakhor and Krichene, 2009), to which increased debt, 
excessive leverage, maturity mismatches, structural imbalances and hence a lack of market 
discipline (Chapra, 2007, 2008) and fat tailed events are associated (Taleb, 2007/2010).  
Robert Holland, who has spent 25 years at various positions in the Federal Reserve System, 
asserts that the ‘instability’ is deeply rooted in the prevailing system, “I do not believe that 
financial instability is born of bad management or lousy regulation. It is inherent in the kind 
of financial system we have built and seem to like”.4 It is under the purview of this view that 
the focus is further strengthened on scrutinizing the elements which necessarily render the 
system inherently unstable.  
                                                            
4 Robert C. Holland in his speech at the 1985 conference titled “The Problem of Financial Stability’, in ‘The 
Search for financial Stability: the Past 50 years” (ed.), Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, p. 1 
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Such insights as well as the increased non-linearity in the system, where  small marginal 
changes are carrying global impacts, seems to have also added impetus to the idea of 
observing the financial system through the lens of ‘Complexity Science’ – including the 
Chaos Theory. Evidence is mounting suggesting that the interest rate debt based financial 
system has indeed become Complex. Consequently, discussions on the complexity of the 
present system and its connections with the forces which render the system uncertain and 
unstable seem to have surged (Mirakhor et. al., 2012).  
To understand the dynamics that have generated the present uncertainty about the interest-
based financing system, it would be helpful to note what is meant by a system and indicate 
differences between simple, complicated and complex systems. A system is defined as “set of 
elements standing in interrelations” to one another (Von Bertalanffy, 1969: 38). Or, as 
Meadows (2000: 2) elaborates “A system is a set of things—people, cells, molecules, or 
whatever—interconnected in such a way that they produce their own pattern of behavior over 
time.” How predictable that “own pattern of behavior over time” may be, depends on the 
nature of the system in terms of the degree of simplicity or complexity of the rules governing 
the interrelationship among its elements. A simple system is quite predictable because of the 
simplicity of its operational rules. For example, old cars had simple starting operations: 
placing keys in the ignition to start the engine. This represents a simple and predictable 
system. Complicated systems contain subsets of simple systems. Their complicated nature is 
often related not only to the scale but also to issues of coordination of specialized expertise. 
Complicated systems are also predictable (Holland, 1995). In contrast to the old cars, newer 
and more technically advanced automobiles represent complicated systems. Instead of a key 
in the ignition, push button remotes are used to start an engine. Despite considerably more 
complicated technologies, modern automobiles still represent predictable systems.  
Complex systems contain both complicated and simple subsidiary parts, but are not reducible 
to either (Goodwin, 1994). By way of summary, it can be stated that Complex systems are 
dynamical and are characterized by non-linearity (Lorenz, 1993). All the heterogeneous 
elements that make up such a system are interconnected together where each element is doing 
its own thing. These systems are governed by feedback loop mechanisms where small, 
marginal changes in the system have significantly large impact on the overall behavior. 
Unavoidably, complex systems innately carry with them large elements of uncertainty and 
ambiguity (Wheatley, 1992), making it difficult to understand, predict and control such 
systems (a more detailed discussion on the characteristics of a complex system will be 
covered in chapter four). Over the last several decades the view that economic reality is 
somehow fundamentally complex has increasingly taken hold among economists, not only 
those focused on abstract theory but even policymakers as well (Greenspan, 2004).   
 
In early 1940s, a British mathematician, Alan Turing, was perhaps the first modern scientist 
to formulate complexity. The hallmark of his contribution was a paper he wrote about the 
growth of biological system in which he put forward the idea of “morphogenesis” (Turing, 
1952). He showed that a biological system described by two simple equations with feedback 
loops among the variables was capable of behaving in totally unpredictable, complex 
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patterned behavior. A decade later, an American meteorologist, Edward N. Lorenz, tried to 
predict the weather with computers but instead gave rise to the modern field of chaos theory, 
developed models with feedback loops to increase the accuracy of weather forecast (Lorenz, 
1963). In another paper (Lorenz, 1964) he showed how a small twiddling of parameters in a 
model could produce vastly different behavior, transforming regular, periodic events into a 
seemingly random chaotic pattern. In summary, his models showed two things: 
unpredictability of weather systems and the significantly large impact of small, marginal 
changes in local individual element’s behavior on the global behavior of the system. This last 
point made famous “The Butterfly Effect” also known as "sensitive dependence on initial 
conditions"5. However, Benoit Mandelbrot while reaching the same conclusion using a 
relatively simple equation with feedback interaction claimed further that all the theories in 
finance were wrong because they relied on Gaussian (normal) probability distributions and 
the Brownian motion, both of which assume regularities. He pointed out that nearly all 
economic and financial variables, particularly stock prices and commodity prices, behaved 
irregularly
6
. Their behavior, Mandelbrot argued, was better described by ‘Fractal Geometry 
and mathematics’ than by Gaussian distribution and Brownian motion (Mandelbrot and 
Hudson, 2004) as they are instead characterized, Mandelbrot suggested, by jumps rather than 
smooth motion. Since finance theories were wrong so would be their predictions; the recent 
financial crisis has vindicated his claims.  
Peters (1996) argued the need for a new way of looking at markets behavior. He claimed 
(similar to Mandelbrot) that the assumptions of efficient markets and rational investors in 
mainstream theories are a fallacy. On the basis of ‘chaos theory’ he showed that in fact 
markets are non-linear dynamic systems with feedback effects, criticality levels as well as 
fractal in nature. He further argued that such a system is always far from equilibrium. 
Chorafas (1994) echoes both Mandelbrot and Peters and suggests that neither linearity nor the 
hypotheses of normal distribution can provide the right support in understanding markets. 
Financial analysts have to turn their attention to non-traditional means of research and 
analysis in figuring out financial market behavior. These new tools, he argues, come under 
the heading of ‘Complexity Theory’ and include tools such as ‘non-linearities’, 
‘bifurcations’, chaos theory, fractals and other fuzzy engineering techniques. 
 
Schwarcz (2009) regarded the complexity of the present system as the greatest financial 
market challenge of the future.  Through analysis drawn on chaos theory and other 
                                                            
5 The ‘butterfly effect’ was a phrase discovered in Edward Lorenz's talk for the 139th meeting of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science in 1972. Titled, “Does the flap of a butterfly wing in Brazil set off 
a tornado in Texas” 
6 Louis Bachelier (1900), in his thesis, the theory of speculation, developed the notions of stochastic process 
characterizing financial variables. Two main stochastic processes have become known in finance: the random 
walk and the martingale processes. A more encompassing approach to uncertainty uses Levy processes that 
allow for both jumps and smooth motion. 
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approaches used to analyse complex systems, the author examines the ways in which 
complexity can cause markets to fail; arguing further that the complexities of modern 
financial markets can exacerbate these market failures with nonlinear feedback, enticed by 
even a minute change in any part of the system. He further suggests that “solutions should 
take inspiration from chaos theory, which recognizes that failures are almost inevitable in 
complex systems and that successful systems are those in which the consequences of a failure 
are limited”.  
 
Johnson (2007) while contending the complexity of the financial markets suggests that 
complex systems have a tendency to move from order to disorder and vice versa. While 
arguing that such movements cannot be predicted, for financial markets, crises are actually a 
move towards an ordered state; sufficing that the ordered state of such a complex system is 
actually disorder. George (2012) in the latest book titled: Nonlinearity, Complexity and 
Randomness in Economics, argues: “Those of us who have marvelled at the non-linear 
feedback loops between asset prices in illiquid markets and the funding illiquidity of financial 
institutions exposed to these asset prices through mark-to-market accounting, margin 
requirements, calls for additional collateral, etc. will appreciate what is lost by this castration 
of the macroeconomic models. Threshold effects, critical mass, tipping points, non-linear 
accelerators – they are all out of the window. Those of us who worry about endogenous 
uncertainty arising from the interactions of boundedly rational market participants cannot but 
scratch our heads at the insistence of the mainline models that all uncertainty is exogenous 
and additive. The first lesson to draw from the current crisis within Economics is clearly that 
our models must embrace non-linearity: linearized models with their saddle point dynamics 
and ‘jump variables’ no longer serve any useful purpose” (See George and Oxley, 1999/2008 
for a detailed discussion of this point). Steve Kuchta of the University of Connecticut also 
suggests the complexity of the financial system, basing his arguments on the growing use of 
nonlinear dynamic system models in economics, their application in financial asset pricing, 
and most interestingly how ‘chaos theory could be the key to putting it all together (Kuchta, 
2010).   
 
Schweitzer et al. (2009) argue that the current economic crisis illustrates a critical need for 
new and fundamental understandings of the structure and dynamics of economic networks. 
Economic systems are increasingly built on interdependencies of both behavior and 
information, leading to a global economy where credit and investment, trade and input-output 
flows, research and innovation all occur at a truly world scale that gives rise to a hugely 
complex system that is difficult to predict and control. Moreover, some inter-dependencies 
become obvious only during and after the crisis−such as tight global credit couplings− 
developing as self-fulfilling phenomena, without precursory signatures. 
 
The complexity of the modern global economy is exacerbated among 
others, by the speed and scope of credit spread across national and 
globally networked markets, with variable intensity of ties and of 
scale. A small shock in the debt repayment- through either 
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endogenous or exogenous means− can lead to mass scale effects; 
making the attempts to understand or control the emergent and 
volatile networks very difficult indeed. In particular, the danger of 
cascading failures or the spread of opportunistic behavior through the 
economic networks is greater today than ever. Self-feeding effects, 
reinforcing each other through a co-evolving network, can lead to 
large-scale and abrupt consequences that may be hard to anticipate 
and tackle 
Ilya Prigogine (1980, 1989 and 1997) suggested that for a complex system, there is a “point 
of bifurcation”, a moment of truth, for the system to choose which path it follows. Chaos 
Theory suggests that a complex system approaching a bifurcation point becomes so sensitive 
that it can amplify small changes into large feedbacks. Decisions made at such a point lead 
the system either toward greater chaos or toward higher order (Mirakhor and Hamid, 2009, p. 
231).  It appears that the “point of bifurcation” has been operating to increase regime 
uncertainty. At every ‘bifurcation point’ reached, policy makers seem to have made decisions 
that have rendered the system more unstable. 
 
The relevance of complex dynamic has also been particularly stressed by Barkley Rosser 
(2004, 2005) in several works. The author considered indeed complex dynamic a strong 
foundation for Keynesian models and results. Similar intuitions have also been articulated by 
scholars such as Gilson, (1984); W. Brian Arthur, John Holland, Blake LeBaron, and Richard 
Palmer, (1997), Henry Hu, (2008), Gary Gorton, (2008) and Robert Bartlett, (2010). All have 
conceded to the increasing complexity of the financial system and have suggested it as among 
the leading contributors in intensifying the financial instability and hence the presence of 
regime uncertainty.  
Andrew Sheng (2009) in his book titled “From Asian to Global Financial crisis”, states: 
 
... Consequently the signal difference between the Asian and the Global 
crisis is not just tone of the size, but in essence the complexity of the 
global financial order...The world has moved from the decade of the so 
called ‘Great Moderation’ to a period of grave uncertainty...Those who 
look for sensationalism would love for crisis to be a tale of 
conspiracies... However, the more I studied markets, the more I realised 
that markets events are of spontaneous order (non-linear). There is no 
single architect- there may be many conspiracies or plots trying to 
influence the tide one way or the other, but it is the interaction amongst 
all parties-some deliberative, some calculated other random- that cause 
events to unfold like a tsunami. Not even the most brilliant minds in the 
world, nor the largest economy in the world, could stop the force of the 
crisis... all are concerned about the possibility of a serious financial 
instability; creating vulnerabilities which necessitate the occurrence of 
events which were/are thought as rare. (p, 6-15). 
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In line with the above and in consideration of the non-linearities and the large gyrations that 
are caused by small shocks in the system, Taleb (2007/2010) introduced the notion of ‘Black 
Swans’; events with very low probability of occurrence but with significantly large impact; 
quite reminiscent of the ‘Butterfly effect’. He termed these events as ‘Black Swans’ due to 
their rare appearance. Recently, the global system has experienced events that would have 
been thought of as low probability events not long ago. These include, inter alia, the down 
grading of U.S from its ‘AAA’ rating, the looming collapse of the much hailed Eurozone, the 
effort by Switzerland to convince the world that Swiss franc is not a safe haven, the Brazilian 
suggestion of bailout of advanced economy by emerging markets, China’s contemplation of 
buying Italy’s debt, and the Libor rate fixing. The list can go on. Looming in the background 
of the present uncertainties in the global economy there is a potential event, termed as “the 
mother of all black swans”, the effects of which may be chaotic global economy: contagion-
riddled events of sovereign default. As suggested earlier, looming in the back ground of the 
present uncertainties in the global economy, there is a potential event termed as “the mother 
of all black swans” the effects of which may be chaotic to global economy: contagion-riddled 
events of sovereign default.  
It can be stated, by way of summary that: (i) in a complex system, elements are independent, 
adaptive and interactive; there is a feedback process at work; (ii) such systems are 
characterized by an unpredictable, infinitely complex patterned behavior; (iii) they are all 
characterized by “bifurcation points” at which a system can either move to more stability and 
order or to chaos; (iv) in such systems, small, marginal changes have significantly large 
impact on their behavior; and (v) there is a limitation to the cognitive ability of the human 
mind to understand, describe, predict and control such systems’ behavior.  
The global financial crisis of 2007/2008 and its continuing adverse economic and social 
consequences, as well as the failure of significant policy actions to elicit the desired response, 
seem to provide evidence that the global financial system displays the characteristics of a 
complex system. Added to the increased frequency of occurrence of “fat tail” events, 
increased poverty and worsening distribution of income and wealth in individual and 
collective economies have intensified regime uncertainty. Such doubts about the 
sustainability of a system based on the interest rate debt financing had been expressed as 
early as 1930s by John Maynard Keynes and later by Maurice Allais (1999) among others. 
Focusing on the interest rate mechanism, Keynes in as early as 1930s argued in his book The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) argued that market capitalism, if 
left to it-self, would create two major problems. These are (i) poor income and wealth 
distribution and (ii) the fact that this system is incapable of creating full employment. A 
major cause of these problems, he asserted, was the interest rate mechanism which 
constituted “the villain of piece” (see Mirakhor and Krichene, 2009).  Keynes solution was 
the “euthanasia of rentier” by socializing financial resources through which financial capital 
would be provided for investment without the intermediation of the rent seeking class of the 
money lenders. Keynes’s claims of poor income and wealth distribution could be further 
validated by a recent study which showed how high leverage and crises can arise as a result 
of changes in the income distribution (Kumhof and Ranciere, 2010). The authors empirically 
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showed that the periods 1920-1929 and 1983-2008 both exhibited a large increase in the 
income share of the rich, a large increase in leverage for the remainder, and an eventual 
financial and real crisis. Much earlier, Karl Marx (1867, 1885 and 1894) had already put 
forward his understanding of the innate fragility of capitalism. While recognizing that the 
system may create economic growth, Marx argued that the growth will never be sustainable 
and the system will collapse on its own; taking back much more than what it gave.  
 
A fact that can be discerned from the historical analyses of nearly all financial crises is the 
potential destabilizing role of the interest rate mechanism in the debt-growth dynamics of the 
economies. In general, the condition to be solvent requires that the rate of growth of the 
economy must be greater than the rate of interest (cost of borrowing). This can be further 
supported by the findings of Frank Ramsey who in 1920s analyzed the interaction of the 
growth rates of the economy, population and interest rate. He used the interaction of the rate 
of population growth, the growth of market determined interest rate and the growth of 
economy to deduce the following: if the rate of economic growth exceeded the other rates i.e. 
the market determined rate of interest and the rate of population growth, the economy would 
grow. A steady state was when all the three rates were in equilibrium; however when the 
market determined interest rate growth surpassed the growth of the economy and the growth 
of population, economic activity would begin a downward spiral. He found that whenever the 
interest rate growth surpassed the other two rates, economic progress was dampened7 
(Ramsey, 1928). In this context it is worth noting that the artificially low interest rates 
contrived by central banks’ easy monetary policy may have disrupted economies, financial 
markets, and spread financial chaos as recent debt crises have clearly established. There 
seems to be an adverse debt dynamics at work in the global economy presently where, even 
at artificially low interest rates, the rates of growth of economies is not sufficient to validate 
the growing debt. Hayek, (1945) contented that it is the price setting of money i.e. the interest 
rate and the manipulation of it by the policy makers that is at the root of generating crisis.  
Hyman Minsky, one of the most perceptive, productive and brilliant followers of Keynes, 
pushed forward the frontiers of “the classical Keynesian” (as opposed to “bastard Keynsian”) 
thought to produce valuable insights into the working of financial capitalist system (Krichene 
and Mirakhor, 2008). Minsky the inventor of the ‘Financial Instability Hypothesis’ spend 
about forty years in studying and analysing the financial crises. As put forward by Belouafi 
(2012: 9-10), “his findings led him to conclude that there is a fundamental flaw in the 
conventional economic system. This flaw is related to the type of financing regime and the 
contractual arrangements that develop over time, a fundamental property of all capitalist 
                                                            
7
 In this context it is worth noting that the artificially low interest rates contrived by central banks’ easy 
monetary policy may have disrupted economies, financial markets, and spread financial chaos as recent debt 
crises have clearly established. There seems to be an adverse debt dynamics at work in the global economy 
presently where, even at artificially low interest rates, the rates of growth of economies is not sufficient to 
validate the growing debt (Mirakhor et al., 2012).  
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economies is the existence of a system of borrowing and lending based upon various margins 
of safety… a debt instrument or a lease provides for payments to be made on account of both 
interest and principle. An equity liability has only a contingent commitment to make 
payments, dividends need to be paid only if earned and declared, and there is no contractual 
need to repay principle. For any given cash flow, from operations or from the fulfillment of 
owned contracts, the greater the share of equity financing in a balance sheet the greater the 
margin of safety that protects the owners of the non-equity liabilities". 
Minsky, in his works, had observed the growing fragility of the U.S. financial system since 
1966, where a bubble’s boom and bust in one asset market was followed by formation and 
implosion of another bubble in a different asset market as liquidity and credit expansion led 
to these booms and busts in which major players that had failed were bailed out by the 
government. These included the emerging market debt crisis, LTCM, dotcom, housing, and 
commodities bubbles. As financialization would help create one asset market after another, 
expanding liquidity and credit in search of yield would create one bubble after another (see 
Mirakhor and Krichene, 2008).  
The question that arises is whether there is an alternative to the present dominant global 
financial system. Perhaps a practical alternative would be to step back from targeting the 
interest rate mechanism and focus on the incentive structure that has rendered interest-based 
debt financing such a destabilizing force in the global economy. This can be accomplished by 
reorienting the system from relying on risk transfer and risk shifting to risk sharing. 
IV.  THE REGIME UNCERTAINTY 
The idea of “regime uncertainty” (Higgs, 1997) argues that a major cause of the intensity and 
duration of the Great Depression was the depth of the uncertainty (ambiguity) surrounding 
the policy regime of the time and its economic and financial consequences. This type of 
uncertainty can arise from many sources, ranging from simple tax-rate increases to the 
imposition of new kinds of taxes to outright confiscation of private property. It can also arise 
from various sorts of regulation, for instance, of securities markets, labor markets and product 
markets. The security of private property rights rests not so much on the letter of the law as 
on the character of the government that enforces, or threatens, presumptive rights. Henry 
Morgenthau, the Treasury Secretary in President Roosevelt administration in the 1930s, 
encapsulated the wide ranging uncertainty as follows: 
“…Uncertainty rules the tax situation, the labor situation, the monetary 
situation, and practically every legal condition under which industry 
must operate. Are taxes to go higher, lower or stay where they are? We 
don’t know. Is labor to be union or non-union? . . . Are we to have 
inflation or deflation, more government spending or less? . . . Are new 
restrictions to be placed on capital, new limits on profits? . . . It is 
impossible to even guess at the answers.” (Higgs, 2006: 16) 
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There seems to be the debt dynamics at work in the global economy presently. A serious 
problem facing the global economy today is the situation of debt overhang which has made 
the present system to reach a point of criticality and bifurcation; creating debilitating fears of 
contagion and recurrence of full-fledged global crisis. Given the prevailing conditions of low 
growth, validation of the debt of the scale that exists now is in doubt. There is the prospect 
that countries, including some among the advanced economies, could default on their debt 
with defaults taking many forms. It could be an outright default as in the 1980s for middle- 
and low-income countries. It could be in the form of near-zero interest rates by denying 
creditors any return on their lent capital. It could be in the form of high or hyperinflation that 
wipes the real value of debt. The fiscal theory of the price level argues that the government 
will inflate money to reduce the real debt burden. The prospects of high world inflation are 
likely in view of the large indebtedness in many industrial countries. It will amount to an 
inflation tax levied on consumers and on holders of money. 
Krugman (1988) coined the term ‘debt overhang’ and asserted it as a situation in which “A 
country has a debt over-hang problem when the expected present value of potential future 
resource transfers in less than the debt”. Over the past few decades, a consensus had 
emerged that expansion of credit and debt is detrimental to the stability of developed as well 
as developing economies (Mirakhor and Krichene, 2008). With high debts interest payments 
also increase, thus increasing both the burden and servicing of debtThe most serious problem 
facing the global economy today is the situation of debt over hang and, more importantly, the 
risk of sovereign default.  
Rising debt is a drag on macro-economic stability, growth and development. It is also a major 
source of fiscal and current account deficits, thus aggravating the fiscal crisis which is 
reflected in such further complications as pressure on the exchange rate (widespread 
exchange losses in public debt portfolio) and diminishing private sector investment. Higher 
indebtedness also translates into low credit rating by credit rating agencies which in turn 
discourages FDI and foreign portfolio investment. Higher debt-to-GDP ratios suppress 
output, private consumption and government spending on public goods such that welfare 
costs increase with every incremental increase in debt. Hence, higher debt levels make 
stabilization more costly and induce shirking by governments.  
 
A number of renowned conventional economists, since the early 19th century have observed 
a number of common features that precede the occurrence of financial crises (see also Askari 
et al. 2012). According to Belouafi, (2012: 8-9), “among the features relating to the ‘interest’ 
issue are the following: An extended period of low interest rates as was the case in the 
subprime financial crisis of 2007-20088. Such a policy has led to the huge growth of a non-
backed expansion of credit. Soros (2008) noted ‘when money is free (or quasi-free), the 
rational lender will keep on lending until there is no one else to lend to’ (see also Askari et al. 
2010: 18). This situation has been attributed to the development of another axiom; it is the 
                                                            
8 “Yet these low or even zero-rates are suggested as remedies in the aftermath of FCs. This paradox indicates the 
puzzling dilemma of the interest rate itself” (Belouafi, 2012).   
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fact that ‘too much money is chasing too little assets’. Under such a scenario there is no other 
way that this ‘too much money’ can be absorbed except through the appearance of a 
bubble(s) that will grow without any economic foundations. The appearance of a bubble(s) 
will feed the expansion of the unbacked credit, and the vicious circle continues until the 
bubble (s) burst. If such a situation arose, the huge volumes of the non-backed credit will 
meltdown, as it was no more than mere promises that were sought to be validated at a certain 
point in the future. Thereafter, another cycle of the bail-outs programmes, from the tax payers 
money, and the cheap money through zero-interest rate policy (ZIRP), quantitative easing and 
other sophisticated measures will come out from the ‘the conventional box’ of policy makers 
to the rescue of the ‘too-big-to-fail’ institutions and to fix other financial and economic 
distortions”  
Large part of the theoretical and the empirical analysis has focused on the effects of debt 
accumulation and its impact on overall economic growth. All have pointed to a negative 
relationship between excessive debt and economic growth trends. Contributions by Buchanan 
(1958) and Meade (1958) revealed that the national debt is a burden for next generations, 
which comes in the form of a reduced flow of income from a lower stock of private capital. 
Apart from a direct crowding-out effect, they also pointed out to the impact on long-term 
interest rates, possibly in a non-linear form. Adam and Bevan (2005) find interaction effects 
between deficits and debt stocks, with high debt stocks exacerbating the adverse 
consequences of high deficits.  
 
Empirical evidence also confirms the debt overhang effects. Pattillo et al. (2002, 2004) show 
how the stock of debt is the reason for a slow growth, while Chowdhury (2004) finds that 
both the debt burden and the debt service obligations squeeze investment and the economic 
performance. Clements et al. (2003) investigates the relationship between external debt 
investment and growth in 55 low income countries, finding some empirical evidence of the 
debt overhang. Estimating a simple growth model and using panel data, they find that over a 
certain threshold, more debt lead to negative growth rates (the thresholds of 30-37% of GDP, 
or 115-120% of exports). Presbitero (2005) shows using a dynamic panel model that a huge 
debt burden has a negative and non-linear effect on GDP growth, arguing that the basic 
relationship is negative. Other studies like Cohen (1993), Elbadawi et al. (1999), Cordella et 
al. (2005), Imbs et. al., (2005) and Cohen (1993) also suggest a negative dynamic between 
debt super cycles and economic growth.  
 
The 2007/2008 global financial crisis has been studied and analyzed extensively by now and 
a variety of causes have been suggested. In 2010, Cristine Checherita and Philipp Rother of 
ECB, studied the last 40 years period of the debt super cycle in the Eurozone and found a 
non-linear impact of debt on growth with a turning point—beyond which the government 
debt-to-GDP ratio has a deleterious impact on long-term growth—at about 90-100% of GDP. 
Confidence intervals for the debt turning point suggest that the negative growth effect of high 
debt may start already from levels of around 70-80% of GDP, which calls for even more 
prudent indebtedness policies. At the same time, there is evidence that the annual change of 
the public debt ratio and the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio are negatively and linearly 
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associated with per-capita GDP growth. The channels through which government debt (level 
or change) is found to have an impact on the economic growth rate are: (i) private saving; (ii) 
public investment; (iii) total factor productivity (TFP) and (iv) sovereign long-term nominal 
and real interest rates (Cristine and Rother, 2010).  
 
Reinhart and Rogoff, in their recent paper, studied the period of 200 years for 44 countries for 
which data was available. They showed that the growth of the economy is adversely affected 
as the ratio of debt-to-GDP goes beyond 30% and nears 100% (reaching a potentially 
unexpected bifurcation point), eventually creating a situation where the GDP is only able to 
service the interest payments and the whole system become fragile (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2010a). Reinhart and Reinhart (2010b) examined the behavior of real GDP (levels and 
growth rates), unemployment, inflation, bank credit and real estate prices in a twenty-one 
year window surrounding selected adverse global and country-specific shocks or events. The 
episodes include the 1929 stock market crash, the 1973 oil shock, the 2007 subprime collapse 
and fifteen severe post-World War II financial crises. They presented evidence that the 
decade of relative prosperity prior to the falls was importantly fueled by expansion in credit 
and rising leverage that spans about 10years. It is followed by a lengthy period of 
retrenchment that most often only begins after the crisis and lasts almost as long as the credit 
surge.  
Arcand et al., (2012) used different empirical approaches to show that there can indeed be 
“too much” finance. In particular, their results suggested that finance starts having a negative 
effect on output growth when credit to the private sector reaches 90%-100% of GDP. The 
IMF reached similar conclusions in its “post-mortem” of the Asian financial crisis in the late 
90s and recommended a safe level of government debt-to-GDP of no more than 25%. They 
further advised avoidance of debt-creating flows; an advice that was not taken by the 
advanced economies. As stated earlier, present empirical research suggests that the debt-to-
GDP ratio of the richest members of the G-20 threatens to touch 120% mark by 2014 while 
by 2020; the U.S. and the other major European centers would amass a ratio of at least 150%, 
with Japan and U.K. going to 300% and 200% respectively. Even more disconcerting is the 
projected interest rate paths on their debts which would increase from now almost 5% to 10% 
in all cases, and as high as 27% in U.K. (BIS, 2010), all this alongside an extremely anemic 
global GDP growth at the rate of 2.5%-3.3% (World Bank, 2012). 
According to the recent IMF Fiscal Monitor (2011), the average debt per working age person 
in advanced economies will increase from US$ 27,600 in 2007 to US$ 62,000 in 2016 and 
from US$ 1,500 to US$ 2,200 in emerging markets. In 2009, the IMF estimated that gross 
general government debt in high-income advanced G-20 economies is expected to grow from 
78 percent of their GDP in 2007 to 120 percent in 2014, an increase of 40 percent over a 7 
year period.  In a recent study, Reinhart et. al. (2012) suggests a threshold of 90 percent 
where debt imposes a serious drag on the growth of an economy. These countries suffer from 
high unemployment, fiscal instability, low capacity utilization and high debt and leverage. 
They further note: “Led by European countries, the surge in external debt since early 2000s 
is unprecedented…..For Europe as a whole. Public and private external debts are already 
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more than the double the 90 percent threshold and constitute a considerable source of 
uncertainty.” (Reinhart et al., 2012: 7). The stress and strain on the international trade and 
financial system and its associated arrangements did not suddenly become apparent after the 
2007/2008 global crisis; in the 1990s Japan, Russia, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico were 
already sending distress signals (Mirakhor, 2002). Neither the signals nor the lessons of these 
crises made any noteworthy impact on the way the world economic system and its policies 
were being steered.  
The lessons had been distilled most effectively by the IMF, from the “post-mortem” analyses 
of the Asian, Brazilian, Argentinian, Russian, Mexican crises of the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Reforms and remedies were suggested but were only implemented, most strongly, in 
the case of emerging and developing countries. The advanced countries perceived their 
economies immune to the forces of instability. Growing vulnerabilities, however, built up the 
pressures that proved dramatically the folly of such perceptions. Uncertainties, ambiguities 
and complexities governing the present architecture and configuration of policies, seem to 
exacerbate the perception that the present financing regime is unable to mitigate effectively 
the risks to the global economy. Hence, there is a palpable anxiety and growing concern 
leading to the search for an alternative to the present interest-based debt financing regime. 
Mauldin and Tepper in their latest book tiltled “The End Game” has described the present 
situation as a debt ‘super cycle’; referring essentially to the decades-long growth of debt from 
small and manageable levels, to a point where bond markets rebel, (translating into an 
‘effective default’) and the debt has to be restructured or reduced if not formally defaulted”. 
They refer to the current situation as an Endgame, where the end of the global debt super 
cycle is inevitable as it is no more sustainable. They state very clearly: 
“The debt laden situation is going to cause a lot of pain. It is not 
a question of pain or no pain; it is just when and how we decide 
(or are forced) to take it. There are no easy paths, but some bad 
choices are less bad than others”. … “We have shifted the crisis 
from homebuyers to banks and then finally to government. There 
is no one else to step in. We are at the Endgame, a point of 
criticality in the system. 
V. THE INHERENT INSTABILITY OF THE INTEREST-BASED CREDIT SYSTEM 
Evidence surveyed in many studies showed that every economic and financial crisis was 
preceded by an expansion of credit (e.g. Fisher, 1933). A number of influential scholars, in 
the past, proposed reforms that would abolish the credit system and replace it by an equity-
based investment system. For instance, Walker (1873) opposed fictitious credit creation by 
banks and favored the creation of joint stock companies which use savings to buy equities. 
Among celebrated reforms was the plan formulated in the University of Chicago, ‘Chicago 
Memorandum’ in 1933 which called for 100% reserve money and for an equity-based 
investment system. In the modern banking system, a bank can simply create credit ex-nihilo 
by simply crediting the account of its customer for the amount of credit. Such credit becomes 
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deposits for the borrower, on which it may issue orders for payments. Since, every bank does 
the same thing, viz, it credits its client for the amount of a loan, credit expansion can be very 
fast, and credit far exceeds real savings in the economy. Credit creates deposits. The excess of 
credit over savings is called fictitious credit by Henry Thornton (1802). It is called 
counterfeiting by Allais (1999). Excess credit creates price inflation and forces savings upon 
workers and fixed income households when price of staples increase considerably. 
Theoretically, credit may expand in relation to created deposits according to the reserve 
requirements ratio. If a bank creates a credit of US$ 1,000 and if the reserve requirement ratio 
is five percent, then total money creation is equal to US$ 20,000 – a multiple of 20. Credit 
expansion in the US during the period of run up to the 2008 crisis contributed to inflate 
housing prices and later caused widespread banking crisis. Analogously, this same scenario 
can be applied to the case of a number of sovereigns facing default today. 
Importantly, credit expansion has contributed to a financialization of the economy, i.e., an 
increase in the relative size of the financial sector in relation to the rest of the economy. Too 
much resource has been allocated to financial markets, in the form of thousands of speculative 
entities such as investment funds, structured finance companies and hedge funds. In turn, the 
growth of these institutions and instrument innovation for speculation and hedging added 
substantially to the opacity and complexity of the financial system leading to greater 
uncertainty. Moreover, traders instead of investors dominate the financial markets. With very 
low interest rates, speculators, in search of yield, engineer structured products to increase 
monetary returns and play games against each other. As a result, trading in derivatives has 
also soared. According to Bogle (2012: 6), “trading in S&P 500-linked futures totaled more 
than $60 trillion in 2011, five times the S&P 500 index total market capitalization of $12.5 
trillion. The credit default swaps alone had a notional value of $33 trillion. Add to this total a 
slew of other derivatives, whose notional value as 2012 began totaled a cool $708 trillion. All 
this in comparison to $150 trillion: the aggregate capitalization of the world’s stock and bond 
markets”. The loss of J P Morgan of about US$ 5.8 billion in July 2012 is a gain of hedge 
funds who bought its structured products. Bogle (2012: 4-5), in his latest book titled “The 
Clash of Cultures: Investment v/s Speculation”, has described this unprecedented surge in 
financialization and speculation as Capitalism’s ‘mission aborted’.  
“The general mission of the markets was/is capital formation, involving allocation of 
investment capital to most promising industries and companies, both existing and 
upcoming. However, out of $33 trillion stock trading in financial markets, only 0.8% 
or $250 billion of the financial activities fulfill the original mission and the rest 
99.2% or $32.73 trillion aborts it.”  
Hans Tietmier, the then President of Bundesbank, warned in international fora that “financial 
decoupling” was increasing the risks in global finance, (Menkoff and Tolksorf, 2001). These 
warnings were not attended to and consequences followed (Epstein, 2006).  
Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) investigated how financial development affects growth at 
both the country and the industry level. They suggested that “the complex real effects of 
financial development come to two important conclusions. First, both the size and growth of 
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a country’s financial system can be a drag on productivity growth. That is, there comes a 
point where further enlargement of the financial system can reduce real growth, and, because 
the financial sector competes with the rest of the economy for resources, financial booms are 
not, in general, growth-enhancing. Second, using sectoral data, they examine the 
distributional nature of this effect and find that “credit booms harm what we normally think 
of as the engines for growth. This evidence, together with recent experience during the 
financial crisis, leads us to conclude that there is a pressing need to reassess the relationship 
of finance and real growth in modern economic systems. More finance is definitely not 
always better”.  
 
Similar findings were suggested by Maya (2012) arguing that society is better off when 
financial intermediation is restricted. Gorton et al. (2012) also evidence the rampant 
financialization which increasingly got delinked from the real sector and the main supply of 
financial debt has shifted from commercial banks to the “shadow banking system”. Bogle (2012) 
suggests that the increased financialzation has made the real aim of capitalism i.e. capital 
formation, oblivious; arguing that the world of investment has moved from a culture of long term 
to shortermism. There is hence a further blurring of the difference between investment and 
speculation (Bogle, 2012). Such situations necessitate bubbles and are a perfect recipe to create 
financial vulnerabilities with the potential of seeing events we have not seen before. Murizah et 
al. (2011) argue that it is the interest rate mechanism and the ensuing financialization which 
is responsible for the expropriation of wealth, financial fragility as well as financial 
exclusion.  Rajan, (2005) also contends that the surge in financialization has made the world 
more risky; raising system’s sensitivity to black swan events (Taleb, 2007/2010). 
All in all, the result of these activities has been the growth of complexity in the financial 
system with increased vulnerability to shocks. 
VI. ISLAMIC APPROACH TO MONEY AND FINANCE 
Islamic finance is based on the Qur’an and Sunnah (the Prophet’s teachings). It prohibits 
interest rate based debt contracts, although interest-free lending, called qard hassan, is 
permitted. Islamic finance can be envisioned as a two-tier financial system: 
 A 100 percent reserve depository and safekeeping banking system for domestic and 
international payments. 
 A risk-sharing investment banking that places real saving directly in private or public 
projects or indirectly via the stock market. Investors are shareholders. 
The first sub-system keeps money deposits in trust and settles payments via clearing, 
withdrawals and other forms of payments. The second part of the system receives savings, 
which it invests in productive projects or in more liquid investment such as mutual funds or 
stocks. Depositors receive transferable or marketable shares that enable them to liquidate their 
investment if they chose to do so. They share in profits and losses as well as in capital gains 
and losses. Islamic capital markets intermediate between saving units and investing units 
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through risk sharing. They would include investment banking, stock markets, mutual funds, 
exchange-traded funds and other forms of intermediary risk-sharing institutions. 
The objective of Islamic finance is to promote sustained growth and full employment thus 
contributing positively to poverty alleviation and, ultimately, to economic and social justice. 
Growth cannot be achieved without capital accumulation. Investing in capital is the only way 
for achieving growth and employment. Islamic finance, being based on sharing the risk of an 
activity rather than on interest rate driven debt contracts, contributes efficiently to capital 
accumulation and is immune to financial instability and speculation. It is based on growth 
solely and allows no wealth redistribution via interest rate based debt contracts; it insulates an 
economy against banking failure and stock market crashes that have had a constant presence 
in the conventional system [for the proof of existence of a stable non-inflationary economy 
operating in a non-interest rate environment, see Mirakhor (1990, 1993)].  
It can be argued that Islamic finance precludes capital markets’ volatility because in this 
system the close relationship between the real and financial sectors pre-empts misalignment 
of rates of return to finance, the rates of real growth of the economy and net rate of profit. It is 
based on risk taking and risk sharing. 
 
VII. RISK SHARING
9
: A RULE-BASED SYSTEM 
Investors or portfolio managers in general face two kinds of risks. The first is systematic and 
the other unsystematic or idiosyncratic. The former refers to risks that are macro-economic in 
nature and are posed by overall economic settings. These risks are un-diversifiable, hence 
uninsurable. Only effective macro-economic policies and international economic and 
financial coordination can mitigate such risks. Unsystematic or idiosyncratic risk, on the 
other hand, relates to risks that are individuals’ or firms’ specific, emanating from risk of 
shocks to a firm or an individual’s income. Such risks are diversifiable, therefore, insurable. 
High correlation between consumption and income creates vulnerabilities to income shocks. 
However these can be mitigated through risk-sharing arrangements that lessen reliance on 
only one source of income. Therefore, risk sharing reduces the correlation between income 
and consumption that, in turn, lead to consumption smoothing (Mirakhor, 2011b). 
Risk sharing – the essence of Islamic finance – serves as one of the most important desiderata 
of Islam i.e. the unity of mankind. Islam is a rules-based system in which a network of 
prescribed rules governs the socio-economic-political life of the society. Compliance with 
these rules renders the society a union of mutual support by requiring humans to share the 
risks of life (Mirakhor, 2011c). The epistemological root of risk sharing, as the organizing 
principle of the Islamic financial system, is discernible from the verse 275 of chapter 2 of the 
Qur’an. This verse, in part, decrees that all economic and financial transactions are conducted 
via contracts of exchange (al-bay’) and not through interest-based debt contracts (al-riba).  
                                                            
9  For a more detailed vision of the Islamic alternative financial system, see Askari et. al (2012).  
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Since in the Verse the contract of exchange appears first and the prohibition of riba 
thereafter, it can be argued that requiring contracts to be based on exchange constitutes a 
necessary condition and “no-riba” the sufficient condition of existence of an Islamic financial 
system. Together, these conditions constitute the organizing principle of that system. The 
necessary condition (al-bay’) and sufficient condition (no riba) must be met for a contract to 
be considered Islamic (Mirakhor, 2011b).  
Classical Arabic Lexicons of the Qur’an define contracts of exchange (al-bay’) as contracts 
involving exchange of property rights claims in which there are expectations of gains and 
probability of losses (Mirakhor, 2010; 2011b).10 By entering into contracts of exchange, 
parties improve their welfare by exchanging the risks of economic undertakings, thus 
allowing division of labor and specialization. The understanding of al-bay’, the exchange of 
one set of property rights claim for another, as the necessary and “no-riba” as the sufficient 
condition has important implications. Exchange requires the freedom to contract for the 
parties involved and this implies freedom to produce, which then calls for well-protected 
property rights to allow and facilitate production. For exchange to take place, there is a need 
for markets and then for rules that govern behavior of market participants. Rules need 
enforcement and regulation to keep the flow of information smooth thus reducing transaction 
costs. These rules of market behavior include: trust, faithfulness to the terms and conditions 
of contracts, good governance, honesty and transparency in social dealings, rules of property 
rights and market behavior, contract enforcement, distribution and re-distribution. It can be 
argued that full compliance with these rules reduces the informational problems and 
transaction costs thus rendering the system efficient (Askari et. al., 2010).  
Risk and uncertainty are undeniable facts of life. As was discussed earlier, uncertainty stems 
from not only the lack of information but also from ignorance of knowing the response and 
behavior of others under such conditions. The question arises as to why risk and uncertainty 
exist. This question becomes more acute for those who believe in the Supreme Creator of all 
things. Since it is believed that existence of risk and uncertainty is a source of difficulty for 
humans, a Creator-centric question also arises: why create risk and uncertainty for humans? 
Bartholoemu (2008: 230) argues that “a plausible argument for the necessity of risk is that it 
serves as an important ingredient in the recipe of full human development. It provides the 
fertility and diversity of experience to develop our skills and personalities.” The Qur’an, on 
the other hand, provides a more compelling explanation: humans are subjected to tests 
throughout their lives to allow them a sense of the degree to which they, individually and 
collectively, are rule compliant (see for example Qur’an, 2:155; 76:2; 29:2; 9:126; 11:7). 
Without risk and uncertainty, testing would not be possible (Mirakhor, 2009). To ease the 
intensity of anxiety in dealing with tests and, therefore, reduce uncertainty and demand on 
humans’ cognitive ability, the Qur’an prescribes rules of behavior. Principal among these 
rules is that of risk sharing ordained by the Qur’an.  
                                                            
10  See also, for example, Al‐Tahquiq Fi Kalamat Al‐Quran Al‐Karim; Lisan Al‐Arab; Mufradat 
Alfaz Al Quran, Arabic Lexicon, among others. These sources define al-bay’ as “mubadalati al-maali bi al-
maal.” In English this can be rendered as “the exchange of one set of property rights claim for another.” 
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A financial system based on risk sharing would be more stable than one based on risk transfer 
and on risk shifting
11
. A main source of stability is the elimination of interest rate based credit 
system, which has evidently created financial crises, distortions, unemployment, inflation, 
and unjust wealth redistribution. Other sources of this stability are the operational 
characteristics that remove major sources of volatility and instability. Among these 
characteristics are the following: 
 Transparency, trust and faithfulness to terms and conditions of contracts; Say’s law 
applies all the time; spending (e.g., investment arises from real purchasing power and 
not from fictive credit; for instance, consumers spend from earned income and not 
from consumer loans or government transfers; similarly, enterprises invest genuine 
saving).  
 The real values of assets and liabilities −of financial institution− would be equal at all 
points in time. In addition the prospect of instantaneous equilibrium between the asset 
side of the banking system - driven mainly by the real sector of the economy - and the 
liability side means that there must necessarily be a close and direct relationship 
between investment and deposit yields. Due to the close relationship between finance 
and the real sector activities, the rate of return to the latter determines that of the 
former rather than the reverse. 
 Asset/liability risk matching; 
 A coordinated asset/liability maturity structure;  
 Asset/liability value matching such that the value of both sides of the balance sheet 
move simultaneously and in the same direction in response to changes in asset prices; 
and  
 Limitations on credit expansion and leverage, naturally arising from the need for 
credit growth that is tied closely to the expected rate of growth of the real economy.  
It has been shown that a system based on these operational characteristics would be stable 
and capable of producing employment, income and output growth (Askari et. al., 2010). The 
full range of instruments of such a financial system would be expected to run the gamut of 
the spectrum of instruments from short-term, liquid and low-risk financing of trade contracts 
to long-term financing of real sector investment. The lower end of the spectrum would 
provide financing of sales and purchases of products already produced to allow greater 
production, thus, greater employment of resources. At the higher end, it would provide 
financing for planned production in the future; all financing taking place through risk-sharing 
                                                            
11
 Risk Transfer is when among two parties, one party completely transfers the associated risks to the other and 
there is consent and acknowledgement. However, in risk shifting, these risks are shifted to a 3rd party or parties 
without their knowledge or consent and they end up bearing all the risks and the associated adverse outcomes. A 
prime example could the latest crisis where first the risks were transferred through mortgage securitizations and 
then once the mortgage bubble busted, those risks were eventually shifted to the general taxpayers (without 
them knowing). The result is for example higher taxes as the government bailed out the crisis hit financial 
institutions. 
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contracts (Mirakhor, 2010). In such a system there would be no opportunity for pure financial 
transactions, those that have no relation to the real sector of the economy (Mirakhor, 2011a).  
VIII. GLOBAL RISK SHARING 
International capital flows may take the form of lending, direct investment, purchase of 
foreign equity shares and/or bonds. Risk sharing would involve direct investment and equity 
participation in foreign undertakings. One of the most vital arguments put forward in favor of 
globalization was that of improved risk sharing that would result from intensified human 
interaction across the world. On theoretical ground, this would mean expecting much greater 
degree of risk sharing between and among economies – resulting from greater freedom of 
movement of resources, and hence, providing a major source of consumption smoothing in 
the world economy. These developments were expected to lead to progress toward market 
completion, which means increasing the number of marketable securities to meet a large 
number of contingencies – a condition of optimal risk sharing posited in Arrow’s (1971) 
conception. Or, at least, progress could have been expected toward the design and use of 
Arrow’s idea of having securities with pay-offs contingent on the performance of the 
underlying asset, for example, equity-based securities with close links to the real sector of the 
economy (Mirakhor, 2011a). Theoretical research has demonstrated sizeable potential 
welfare benefits of risk sharing12. However, empirical studies have shown only marginal 
gains in risk sharing from globalization. For example, a study by Kim et. al. (2005) has 
shown that even in the fast growing East Asia-10 countries risk sharing has not been as 
significant as would have been expected. 
Analyses of the pre-crises data shows a fast growing, debt-creating process in the global 
financial system with increasingly tenuous links with the growth of the real economy. 
Increased debt-creating flows, a characteristic of financial globalization in the run up to 
2007/2008 crises, does not improve risk sharing, as they either transfer or shift risk. More 
importantly, risk-shifting or risk-transfer financial transactions led global finance toward 
decoupling from real sector activities with the growth of the former outpacing that of the 
latter by double-digit multiples, intensifying the risk of “sudden stops” (Mirakhor, 2011a). 
The contribution of the present configuration of the Islamic finance industry to the growth of 
the real sector has fallen well short of expectations so far. Perhaps the main reason has been 
the fact that the practitioners and financial engineers of this new asset class – growing within 
the conventional financial system – had to design instruments that resembled those prevalent 
in the host system without violating the “no-riba” sufficient condition. This meant creating 
instruments with tenuous relationship to the real sector to weaken the risk of Islamic financial 
transactions borne by market players. Moreover, the instruments designed by the industry 
have been by and large benchmarked to the Libor or closely related reference rates to make 
them more acceptable to large international banks and investors. Hence, the Islamic finance  
industry focused on portfolio behavior with strategy of asset concentration in short-term 
                                                            
12 See, for example, Van Wincoop (1999); Kim et. al. (2005); Lee and Shin (2008). 
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maturities and real estate in the medium-to-long-term maturities, thus replicating the 
vulnerabilities of the conventional system.  
Aside from these problems, there is a risk of path dependency: the risk that the industry will 
continue following the same pattern of behavior because it has proven profitable thus far. 
This growing complacency and doing ‘business as usual’, runs the risk that path dependency 
will render deviations from the true practice of Islamic finance irreversible. This would mean 
continued development of debt-like instruments that are low risk but are devoid of risk-
sharing elements – a vitally important element of Islamic finance. After all, finance is well 
aware of the theory of “spanning” – where one basic asset can span into an infinite number of 
derivative instruments. This theory served as the basis for the rapid development of debt-
based derivative markets worldwide which eventually undermined the stability of global 
finance. 
In general, the industry players in their defense argue that “our clients” are not interested in 
placing their funds at risk, thus discouraging us from risk sharing13. Apparently, this 
argument is unaware that, conceptually, there is a difference between risk taking and risk 
sharing. The former is prior to the latter. The risk of a given project in the real sector is 
determined in that sector; and one bears such risks before entering into the financial sector to 
seek financing. On the other hand, it is at the point of financing where the decision regarding 
the modality of financing – whether it will in the form of risk sharing, transfer or shifting – is 
made. The nature and magnitude of risk taken remains the same and immutable as it enters 
the financial sector at the stage of funds seeking.  
Industry players display a further dimension of inertia in resisting risk sharing. This relates to 
the conceptual “framing” of Islamic finance.  Framing refers to the fact that people’s 
response to risky situation depends on how they form their perception of a given situation and 
that depends on how an event is formulated. People react differently to the same situation 
when it is framed in alternative formulation.   
Framing is closely related to the idea of “prospect” which refers to perception of gains or 
losses attached to decisions. The way prospects are framed can lead to inconsistent behavior; 
if the same objective outcome is framed differently in terms of gains and losses, people 
respond differently. Since losses, are given greater weight than corresponding gains, people 
are in general loss averse. If the outcome is framed either as a gain or loss, people prefer to 
choose gain. For example, the prospects of 10 percent loss and 90 percent gain can be framed 
focusing either on the probability of the loss or the expectation of the gain. It can be argued 
that a major reason for the inertia in the industry for resistance to progress toward risk sharing 
is due to the inability of the stakeholders and practitioners to first understand and then frame 
risk sharing prepositions correctly and effectively. 
                                                            
13 Such arguments are a norm and were also pervasive in the recent International conference on Islamic 
Business, Islamabad, Pakistan (2012) as well as in a recent conference of security commission Malaysia 
(2011) held with the theme of Risk Sharing in finance.  
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While the disappointment with the present performance of the Islamic finance industry is 
understandable, it should be noted that the industry has a short history in which it 
nevertheless has demonstrated remarkable growth. Perhaps it is this performance that has 
triggered evidence of growing interest in non-interest rate based finance. Indications are that 
emerging markets and developing economies are actively considering adoption of 
instruments of Islamic finance. Few are leveraging the “first-mover” status of Malaysia in 
education, manpower training and instrument innovation in Islamic finance to introduce their 
own brand of risk-sharing method of financing. If these efforts succeed, perhaps even the 
benefits of emerging multiple growth centers in the global economy will be further enhanced 
with greater stability and resilience in supporting financial transactions through risk sharing 
(Mirakhor, 2011c).  
Governments, particularly in Malaysia, have been major sources of support for the growth of 
Islamic finance. The same support can extend risk sharing to government finance. Instead of 
issuing a debt-based bond to mobilize funding, governments can use equity participation 
securities for such funding. These instruments can be issued in low denominations and traded 
in the secondary markets. This would allow ordinary consumers and investors to participate 
in the process of owning a share of their government’s activities. These instruments, with the 
incentive for wide participation of the population, could well enhance social solidarity and, 
perhaps, even provide an incentive structure for strengthened governance. Such alternative 
methods of financing government expenditures would be viable particularly in the Asian 
economies with high saving ratios. 
Risk sharing could also be an effective alternative to the debt-based instruments adopted by 
European countries to get out of their sovereign debt crises. For example, a Eurozone country 
can finance its capital spending through equity participation in the form of public-private 
partnership. This type of risk sharing instruments has been proposed by analysts for some 
time now. Shiller (2003), the first to suggest this type of “macromarket” instruments, believes 
that the benefits of risk sharing are substantial but have yet materialized due to the limited 
availability of appropriate instruments. The present regime uncertainty has created a valuable 
opportunity for risk sharing based finance as a viable alternative to the interest-based debt 
financing. 
IX. INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO PROMOTE ISLAMIC FINANCE 
Innovative approaches are required to promote Islamic capital markets. Important areas are 
investment banking, stock markets, trade and crops financing, and the payments system. The 
promotion of stock markets can play an important role in Islamic finance. However, the 
interest-based credit system has considerably reduced the efficiency of these markets as it 
provides credit for speculation and creates abundant liquidity which distorts the returns on 
equities and results in price crashes. Returns become more related to speculation and share 
prices appreciation and only weakly related to the fundamentals of the company. The existing 
instability and prevalence of lax credit policy would be a powerful deterrent to stock 
investors, except for speculators.  
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The Islamic finance industry needs to develop investment banking specialized in long term 
investment in agriculture, industry, mining, and long term trade. Investment banks would not 
provide loans but would participate as shareholders. Depositors in these banks would own 
marketable equity shares that could be traded on the stock market according to market prices. 
Since depositors are generally risk-averse, they would invest only in shares that provide the 
risk-return profile they would seek. This will in turn lead banks to select the most profitable 
projects.  
X. CONCLUSION 
Islamic finance can serve as an alternative to the interest-based debt financing. Theoretical 
research has shown that a non-interest rate based financial system promotes financial stability 
(Mirakhor, 1990). Islamic finance prohibits interest-based debt contracts and therefore 
interest-based credit. Investors share in the risk of economic activities; they select most 
efficient and profitable projects, and share in profits. Return to investment is based on real 
capital productivity. It would be expected that in this system, the private sector would have 
significant potential for investment and growth. Because of one-to-one mapping of the real 
and financial sectors, Islamic finance would be significantly simpler than the interest-based 
debt financing system. Since growth in finance has to reflect growth in the real sector only, it 
is not likely that there would be a decoupling of finance from real sector activities in order for 
the financialization phenomenon to occur. Moreover, because interest-based debt contracts 
are prohibited, debt cannot build up and thus debt overhang symptomatic of interest-based 
financing are avoided. Only recently has there been research confirming what has been 
suspected for some time now. This research demonstrates the large adverse impact of debt 
overhang on economic growth. A study of 26 episodes of past overhangs revealed that: (i) the 
duration of an average overhang episode is 23 years; (ii) during the overhang period, growth 
declines by 1 percent over the period; and (iii) the loss of growth and the long duration of the 
overhang imply “that cumulative shortfall in output from debt overhang is potentially 
massive” (Reinhart et al., 2012). Given the benefits of the risk sharing approach to financing, it 
is reasonable to take seriously the potentially substantial improvement in the overall well-
being of economies and people that could result from its adoption.  
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